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That same day Pharaoh sent this order to the taskmasters and of-
ficers he had set over the people of Israel: "Don't give the peo-
ple any more straw for making bricks! However, don't reduce
their production quotas by a single brick ..
1. INTRODUCTION
In the familiar Biblical passage, when Moses and Aaron requested of
Pharaoh that the children of Israel be given a three-day holiday leave
from the Egyptian brick-making sweatshops, Pharaoh responded by
withdrawing an essential raw material for brick-making in ancient times:
straw. Henceforth, the children of Israel would themselves be required
to forage the countryside for straw, transport it to the brick ovens, and
meet the same rigid production quotas set when the Egyptians were pro-
viding all of the raw materials, including straw.
The plight of black Alabamians in the 1930s was roughly compara-
ble to that of the children of Israel when Moses embarked on that peril-
ous task of delivering them from bondage. Although the Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution purported to free blacks from chat-
tel slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment extended citizenship to them and
accorded them the rights of due process and equal protection, a series of
developments effectively relegated blacks in Alabama and the rest of the
South to slavery's first cousin-Jim Crow.
The First Black Reconstruction resulted in the extension of suffrage
to black men and the election of black Republicans to local, state, and
national offices. The Redemption Legislature of 1874 restored political
power in this state to white Democrats. Two years later, Republican
presidential candidate Rutherford B. Hayes, who had lost the popular
vote, bargained to remove federal troops from the South in return for the
support of the Florida delegation in the Joint Session of Congress. When
he became president, he kept his promise. A few years later, in the infa-
mous Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the Supreme Court provided a safe
harbor for private racist acts by imposing a "state action" requirement in
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment cases. In 1901, a Constitutional
Convention was called in Montgomery for the principal and avowed
purpose of removing black Alabamians from the social and political life
of the state. The Constitution, which was the handiwork of that Conven-
tion, largely achieved its purpose. By the end of the 1930s, the political
and economic status of black Alabamians was little better than their
counterparts in South Africa with one crucial difference: the co-
existence of the Fourteenth Amendment and lawyers willing to chal-
lenge the Jim Crow/apartheid system.
1. Exodus 5:6-8 (The Living Bible).
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These civil rights lawyers often found missing or in short supply
some of the essential raw materials needed for the creation of the brick
foundation for civil rights principles. Victims of discrimination and op-
pression were often afraid to come forward to serve as plaintiffs-for it
sometimes involved not simply a sacrifice of dignity, body integrity,
loss of job-it sometimes called for the ultimate sacrifice of life. Aside
from the lack of fee-shifting statutes when their impecunious clients
prevailed, civil rights lawyers also risked their own lives and the ongo-
ing threat of being disbarred, or charged with the crimes of barratry or
champerty.
The remaining sections of this Article show how the NAACP's Le-
gal Defense Fund and certain of its lawyers undertook the making of
brick without the provision of straw.
A. First Principles of American Law
The role of black American lawyers in the Herculean fight against
American apartheid and its race rulers has only begun to be studied and
reported as an integral component of American legal and social history.2
This special story is worth examining and telling because it reveals a
sordid past, a longstanding, fundamental contradiction between Ameri-
can principle and practice. Moreover, that invidious past has an inescap-
able debilitative legacy that affects every American living today. Indeed,
there are numerous current legal questions that are inextricably linked to
past exclusionary laws that relegated all colored Americans to inferior
castes.3 One can scarcely look at any aspect of American life without
observing the consequences of conscious racial inequality. Not only has
the inequality diminished the legal profession, but every American has
been harmed by the illusion of white supremacy. These first principles
of hereditary racial supremacy and racial inferiority have been corner-
stones of American law.
Black lawyers "have taken the lead in confronting the American
polity with the paradox of inequality within a society founded upon the
doctrine of equality."4 These lawyers have endured and engaged the
2. See generally J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. & JULIA CASS, BLACK IN SELMA: THE UNCOMMON
LIFE OF J.L. CHESTNUT, JR. (1990); FRED D. GRAY, BUS RIDE TO JUSTICE: CHANGING THE
SYSTEM BY THE SYSTEM (1995); WALTER J. LEONARD, BLACK LAWYERS: TRAINING AND
RESULTS, THEN AND NOW (1977); GERALDINE R. SEGAL, BLACKS IN THE LAW: PHILADELPHIA
AND THE NATION (1983); REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS (J.
Clay Smith, Jr. ed., 1998); J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK
LAWYER 1844-1944 (1993); ROBERT W. SPEARMAN & HUGH STEVENS, A STEP TOWARD EQUAL
JUSTICE: PROGRAMS TO INCREASE BLACK LAWYERS IN THE SOUTH 1969-1973 (1974).
3. See generally BRYAN K. FAIR, NOTES OF A RACIAL CASTE BABY: COLORBLINDNESS AND
THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997); Bryan K. Fair, The Anatomy of American Caste, 18 ST.
LOuiS U. PUB. L. REV. 381 (1999).
4. LEONARD, supra note 2, at i.
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many normative explanations for American inequality, whether based on
religious, historical, or biological determinism. At bottom, American
ideology presumed that coloredness caused debilitation, requiring that
superior whites should act for colored persons since they were incapable
of acting in their own best interests. Presumed racial supremacy explains
why blacks were enslaved, why Native Americans were removed, why
Mexicans lost the Southwest, and why Chinese and Japanese persons
were declared ineligible for naturalization. Even some whites have not
been white enough to receive the privileges of whiteness until they
abandoned their ethnic customs and embraced white supremacy.' Black
and other colored lawyers lived under this shadow of presumed incom-
petence, while seeking to dismantle America's discriminatory legacy.
Thus, any racial progress at all is remarkable given the tremendous ob-
stacles to it.
Over time, the cruel paradox sanctioned by the American Constitu-
tion caused the nation's bloodiest war, divided families and regions, and
necessitated restorative federal laws. Black lawyers worked with others
to remind the nation of its basic creed. By principle, all were to be equal
under law. There were to be no castes here. In practice, castes were ex-
tant, most notably race (and gender) castes constructed under law and
custom:
Historically, nothing [had] done more than the law in creating,
maintaining and perpetuating the exploitation, degradation, and
oppression of [colored] peoples. The slave trade was legal. Slav-
ery was legal. The Black codes were legal. Jim Crow laws were
legal. Then, as now, racists made the law, racists interpreted the
law, and racists executed the law. Racism became a major com-
ponent of the fabric of American life.6
This is the essence of institutional racism. Racism is not simply the
work of a few random bad actors. It has been a foundation of American
life and will remain so until the nation fully reconciles what admissions
committees, bar associations, law firms, businesses, judges, juries, voter
registrars, and law enforcement officials, among others, have done or
permitted to be done to colored people. And it remains for black lawyers
and others to link present caste with institutional racism and to persuade
the American polity and its courts that no American has a legal right to
maintain caste over another person. Black lawyers must explain with
others why government has a duty to dismantle all forms of American
5. James R. Barrett & David Roediger, How White People Became White, in RACE AND
RACEs 445-50 (Juan F. Perea et a]. eds., 2000).
6. LEONARD, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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caste.
B. Origins of the Black American Lawyer in the United States
In this post-modem period, when diversity and multiculturalism
have gained currency in American letters, re-centering the significant
contributions of black lawyers helps to reduce their apparent invisibility
and marginality. Consider, for example, Macon Boiling Allen, the first
black lawyer in the United States who was admitted to practice in Maine
in 1844 at the height of sectional division over the legal status of blacks,
whether slave or free.7 Like most of the nation's earliest lawyers, Allen
studied under a white lawyer who then recommended him for bar mem-
bership. 8 Within a year, Allen relocated to Massachusetts, again becom-
ing the first black lawyer there. 9 He was appointed twice to justice of the
peace positions, making him the nation's first black judge.'0 After the
Civil War, Allen moved to South Carolina where he again was admitted
to the bar."
Undoubtedly, one reason that Allen moved so much was that it was
difficult for black lawyers to find clients among whites or blacks who
believed that they could prevail in American courts without a white law-
yer. 12 Racial prejudice was extant in American public life, circumscrib-
ing the narrowest opportunities for colored people and their relation
with whites. As one reads about the travails of Allen and others, one
cannot escape the significance of color then, and one better understands
America's current racial quagmire.
One consequence of race prejudice has been the marginalization of
the contributions of black lawyers. Thus, while many Americans recog-
nize the pivotal role that U.S. Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts
played in arguing the landmark school desegregation case styled Roberts
v. City of Boston 3 in 1850, far fewer know the lead role of Robert Mor-
ris, Sr., the second black lawyer admitted to practice in Massachusetts.
14
Morris worked alongside Sumner, arguing throughout the courts in Mas-
sachusetts that it was illegal for the local school officials to force little
Sarah Roberts to pass by five whites-only elementary schools and attend
7. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 93-95.
8. Jd. at 93.
9. See id. at 93-94.
10. See id. at 94-95.
11. See id. at 95.
12. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 272, 274. This belief was due in part to the view that black
lawyers were regarded as "threats to social peace." Id. at 272. Such beliefs caused black lawyers
to take certain precautions in their practice of law. For example, in Alabama, some black lawyers
enlisted the assistance of white attorneys in murder cases because their presence gave the defen-
dant a better chance at a fair trial. Id.
13. 59 Mass. (1 Cush.) 198 (1850).
14. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 96-97.
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one for colored children.15 Despite his aggressive, steadfast opposition
to the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and a treason charge, Morris' popu-
larity soared. 16 He was a candidate for Mayor of Chelsea and appointed
a magistrate, only the second black to hold a judicial office in the United
States. 17 It took the nation another century to catch up with Morris and
Sumner,' but their work had immediate impact when Massachusetts
adopted new laws banning school segregation by race.' 9
Similarly, most Americans know Thurgood Marshall was the first
black American to serve on the United States Supreme Court, appointed
by President Johnson in 1967, serving for twenty-four terms, until he
was worn out. But his mentor, the great Charles (Charlie) Hamilton
Houston, Amherst and Harvard Law graduate, Professor and Vice Dean
at Howard Law School, Chief Counsel for the NAACP, and veteran la-
bor lawyer, the man who killed Jim Crow, might well have reached the
20Court had he been white enough . Instead, many talented Americans
with darker skin could not be leaders in a nation founded on the princi-
ple of white hegemony. Houston, who once said he would rather die on
his feet than live on his knees,2 t worked himself to death to rid America
of racial caste.22 He is an American hero, unknown and unsung largely
because he was colored.
Recalling the role of black lawyers also reminds us that American
educational opportunities have not been assigned meritocratically. Most
law schools for most of their history had no place for colored students.
Thus, some fifty years after beginning its law school, Harvard Law
School became the first to graduate a black student, George Lewis
Ruffin, in 1869.23 Nearly another century elapsed before Harvard redou-
bled its efforts to recruit a diverse student body through summer law
institutes targeting minority college students and encouraging them to
consider law school. By far, Howard Law School, organized in 1869 by
15. See id. at 97-99.
16. See id. at 99.
17. Id. at 98-99.
18. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding in 1954 that segregation
of children in public schools on the basis of race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
19. An Act in amendment of An Act Concerning Public Schools, 1854 MASS. ACTS ch. 256,
§§ 1-5 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 76, §§ 5, 16 (West 1996)). See also
SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 116 n.30.
20. SEGAL, supra note 2, at 210.
21. Id. (emphasis added). Houston graduated valedictorian from Amherst College as a mem-
ber of Phi Beta Kappa. Id. He was also the first black American elected to the Harvard Law Re-
view and graduated from Harvard Law School in the top five percent of his class. Id. See gener-
ally GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE
FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1983).
22. See SEGAL, supra note 2, at 211. Houston died of a heart attack in 1950 at the age of 54.
Id.
23. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 36.
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John Mercer Langston, 4 graduated more black lawyers than any other
American law school. 25 Thus, graduates of Harvard and Howard led the
way in organizing the black bar and in answering the call to produce
social engineer lawyers who would challenge racial caste in American
life.
26
The life stories of Allen, Morris, Houston, and Ruffin are part of
thousands lost through a monochromatic abridgement that whitens
American history, distorting significant contributions by brilliant,
skilled colored folks. Yet, in a nation where coloredness created a pre-
sumption of inferiority, reconstruction and redemption would require the
best efforts of many social engineers of whatever ethnicity or hue, cou-
rageous persons willing to risk security or life itself to fight entrenched
laws, institutions, and ensconced privilege that taught all Americans, at
least unconsciously, that Americans with darker skin were somehow less
deserving of equal rights. Now, centuries late, supremacy myths have
been debunked and the question remains, can the United States be made
whole? Can colored folks belong to a nation so long pledged to white
domination? Answers to these questions remain elusive. However, it is
difficult to imagine that any group has been more committed than black
lawyers to trying to restore a nation's lost dignity.
Throughout the country, black lawyers have overcome numerous
personal and professional obstacles, joining a profession once closed to
them and working alongside others to eliminate the scourge of color
caste. Specifically in Alabama, between 1940 and 1980, the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund ("LDF") and a few legal giants took the brutal beast
of state-sanctioned, racial segregation by its awesome horns, wrestled it
to the ground, and over time have been slowly destroying its capacity to
generate misery and oppression of colored citizens.27
Although the war continues, in this Article, we build on the land-
24. Id. at 42.
25. See id. at 64.
26. See id. at 43, 148. Howard School of Law held as its aim the production of attorneys who
would seek to apply the law to the economic, political and social problems of the Negro. See id. at
43. Perhaps the most famous graduate of this ideology was Thurgood Marshall.
27. GRAY, supra note 2, at 115, 130, 175, 186, 192, 196, 203. Cases representing the LDF's
struggle against state-sanctioned racial segregation include the following: Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960) (gerrymandering case involving the redrawing of Tuskegee, Alabama, into a
"28-sided sea dragon"); Henderson v. ASCS, 317 F. Supp. 430 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (invalidating
laws with the effect of preventing Negro farmers in Alabama from participating in agricultural
committees); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961) (guaranteeing
due process for Negro students expelled from state schools because of their participation in sit-in
demonstrations); Zellner v. Lingo, 334 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1964) (regarding the right to peaceably
demonstrate and march on the public roads and rights of way); Lucy v. Board of Trustees, 213
F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1954) (highlighting the LDF's first attempt to desegregate The University of
Alabama resulting in Governor George Wallace's famous "stand in the schoolhouse door"; the
University was eventually desegregated in 1963); Parker v. Franklin, 331 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.
1964) (resulting in the desegregation of Auburn University in Alabama); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (representing perhaps the most famous case won by the LDF).
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mark work of J. Clay Smith, Jr., among others, by relating how in Ala-
bama, principally through the brave efforts of a few black lawyers work-
ing with the LDF, Alabama's rigid color barriers were defeated, one by
one. This esteemed group includes among many others, the venerable
dean of the Alabama black bar, the late Arthur Davis Shores, and one
man who is still very much on the scene, Fred Gray. The story is one
worth remembering not just by the black community, but by all Alabam-
ians seeking to understand how a few lawyers changed the state forever.
These lawyers lived greatly in the law, dedicating their lives to the prin-
ciple of equal justice under law.
II. BLACK LEGAL PIONEERS IN ALABAMA
A. Pioneers Before the LDF
The first black lawyers in Alabama gained admission to the profes-
sion after the Civil War, despite widespread race prejudice and doubts
about the general competency of all blacks.28 Moses W. Moore, an 1871
graduate of Howard University Law School, became Alabama's first
black lawyer, admitted to the Mobile bar in 1871 and to the Alabama
Supreme Court in 1872.29 Moore's admission was reported prominently
in the Mobile Daily Register:
Moses Wenslydale Moore, a Negro as black as the ace of spades
... presented himself for examination .... A great deal of inter-
est was manifested on the part of the bar ... from the fact of the
applicant's color. He passed a very satisfactory examination, and
an order was made by the court admitting him to the bar. This is
the first negro ever admitted to the bar in Mobile.3°
Similarly, after Moore's admission to practice in the Alabama Supreme
Court, the Montgomery Daily State Journal hailed "an age of progress,
[for] ten years ago who would have believed that a Negro was capable
of learning the laws sufficiently to practice in the Supreme Court.'
James T. Rapier, who read law, was admitted to the Alabama bar
between 1872 and 1873.32 Within months, he was elected to the Forty-
28. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 13. Many blacks assumed black lawyers to be incompetent
because of their lack of wealth. Id. White lawyers often used this assumption to discourage the use
of black lawyers. Id.
29. Id. at 271.
30. Id.
31. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 271.
32. Id.
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third Congress, serving until 1875.33 William Hooper Councill was the
first lawyer to challenge the racial segregation policy of railroad carriers
with the Interstate Commerce Commission.34
In his path-breaking tome on black lawyers, J. Clay Smith, Jr. de-
votes some attention to Wilford H. Smith.3 5 Smith single-handedly chal-
lenged the property, employment, residency, and literacy requirements,
grandfather clause, and poll tax provision of the 1901 Constitution of
Alabama.36 Predictably, he lost in the Middle District of Alabama, but in
a rather curious opinion by Justice Holmes, that decision was affirmed
for want of federal jurisdiction.37
Attorney Smith may have taken some solace from the fact that three
justices dissented: Harlan, Brewer, and Brown.38 He should have felt
somewhat vindicated by Justice Holmes' opinion in another of his civil
rights cases decided by the Supreme Court in the following year, Rogers
v. Alabama.39
33. Id.
34. Id. Councill was the founder and first president of Alabama A&M University. He was
admitted to the Alabama Supreme Court in 1882, after reading law. Id. at 272. As Judge Clemon
wrote in United States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137, 1148 (N.D. Ala. 1985):
While riding on a first-class railroad car from Tennessee to Atlanta in the summer
of 1887, Councill was roughly evicted from the first class section. He filed a com-
plaint with the newly created Interstate Commerce Commission, which ruled that
Councill had not been treated equally and directed the railroad to provide equal ser-
vice for blacks in the future.
35. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 273. Smith is described as "not only a skilled constitutional
lawyer, but also an exceptional criminal lawyer." Id.
36. Id. at 293-94.
37. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475,487-88 (1903). In Giles, Justice Holmes wrote:
In determining whether a court of equity can take jurisdiction, one of the first ques-
tions is what it can do to enforce any order it may make. This is alleged to be the
conspiracy of a State, although the State is not and could not be made a party to the
bill .... Unless we are prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of
the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an
empty form. Apart from damages to the individual, relief from a great political
wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a State and the State itself, must be
given by them or by the legislative and political department of the government of
the United States.
Giles, 189 U.S. at 487-88.
38. Id. at 488,493.
39. 192 U.S. 226, 229 (1904) (reversing the conviction of a black defendant who had been
indicted by a Montgomery County grand jury from which all blacks were excluded).
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B. Bringing the LDF to Alabama
1. Thurgood Marshall
Thurgood Marshall is, of course, a case study all unto himself.40 Af-
ter finishing Lincoln College, he enrolled at Howard Law School in
1929,41 where he fell under the influence and tutelage of that most amaz-
ing black lawyer-professor, Charles Hamilton Houston.42 Houston was
in the process of transforming Howard into a first-rate school 43 for social
engineers. 44 With young and extremely gifted black faculty, such as Wil-
liam Hastie 45 and James Nabrit, 46 Howard Law School was fast becom-
ing a clinical laboratory where civil rights theories and strategies were
being developed. In this environment, Thurgood Marshall excelled. He
was one of the top students in his class 47 and enjoyed daily exposure and
interaction with Charles Houston. They developed a lifelong admiration
and working relationship.
When he graduated from Howard Law School, Thurgood Marshall
established a practice in his hometown of Baltimore and became very
active in the renewed NAACP Baltimore chapter as its legal counsel. 48
Marshall, joined by Charles Houston, brought suit in municipal court to
desegregate The University of Maryland Law School. 49 The lawsuit was
successful, and in 1935, a municipal judge ordered The University of
40. See generally RANDALL W. BLAND, PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW: THE LEGAL
CAREER OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 1934-1991 (2d ed. 1993); MICHAEL D. DAVIS &
HUNTER CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH (1992);
ROGER GOLDMAN & DAVID GALLEN, THURGOOD MARSHALL: JUSTICE FOR ALL (1992); CARL T.
ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL
(1993); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1936-1961 (1994).
41. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 368 n.275.
42. LEONARD, supra note 2, at 120. While a student at Howard, Marshall assisted Houston
and other attorneys who were acting as defense counsel in a capital murder trial known as the
Cra wford case. Id.
43. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 48-49. When Houston became Vice-Dean in 1929, one of his
first acts was to increase the admissions standards in order to prepare Howard for accreditation by
the American Bar Association. Id. Howard Law School gained its membership to the ABA in
1930. Id.
44. Id. at xi. According to Marshall, Houston's goal was to transform his students into
"skilled professionals and social engineers." Id.
45. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 51. Hastie joined Howard Law School's faculty in 1930 and
was promoted to lecturer in 1931. Id.
46. Id. Nabrit joined the law school faculty in 1936 after becoming an experienced civil
rights lawyer in Texas. Id. His course in Civil Rights in American Law was the first such course
to be taught in U.S. law schools. Id.
47. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 235. Marshall graduated from Howard in 1933 with honors.
Id.
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id. The University of Maryland had accepted blacks in the late 1880s, but ceased to do so
in 1890 after giving in to white student protests. Id.
[Vol. 52:4:11211130
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Maryland Law School to accept black applicant Donald Murray.50
By 1936, Charlie Houston had left Howard Law School to become
the general counsel of the NAACP in New York.5' He invited Marshall
to be his assistant,5 2 and for the next two years Marshall commuted be-
tween Baltimore and New York. In 1938, Houston resigned his NAACP
position and returned to private practice. 3 Thurgood Marshall then be-
came the general counsel of the NAACP. 4
Because the NAACP was bringing so many cases throughout the
nation and challenging segregation by all means necessary, its detractors
took steps to challenge its tax-exempt status. To head off this challenge,
Thurgood Marshall and the other two lawyers in the NAACP's national
office came up with the idea of spinning off from the NAACP and set-
ting up a separate, tax-exempt legal organization to handle cases largely
referred to it by the NAACP.55 The new organization was incorporated
in 1940 as a New York corporation under the name "NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc."56
After becoming general counsel to the NAACP following Charles
Houston's term, Marshall established the LDF to assist with litigation
against segregation in voting, housing, and education. Marshall's strat-
egy was to build relationships with black lawyers throughout the country
who could serve as local counsel. Marshall and other LDF lawyers trav-
ersed the country, especially the South, seeking to dismantle segregation
from public life. About the time that Marshall became general counsel
of the NAACP in New York, Arthur Shores was establishing himself as
a full-service lawyer in Birmingham. The paths of Mr. Marshall and Mr.
Shores probably had crossed even before Mr. Shores passed the bar, but
the firmness of that relationship was set in stone once Mr. Shores be-
came the Alabama lawyer handling NAACP cases57 and Mr. Marshall
became the lead lawyer for the NAACP. Eventually, Mr. Shores became
the regional counsel for the LDF, participating in LDF cases throughout
the South, including Biggs v. Elliott,58 one of the cases decided with
50. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 148.
51. Id. at 17. Hamilton's appointment was significant because prior to 1933 this position had
only been filled by white attorneys. Also, his appointment "assured the black community that one
of its own lawyers would play a decisive role in the NAACP." Id.
52. Id. at 148. Marshall joined the NAACP staff in 1936 partly because the job offered a
monthly salary of $150 and because the position allowed him to devote all of his practice to civil
rights law. Id.
53. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged Sword: Charles Hamilton Houston and
Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism. 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 17, 23 (1998).
54. Id.
55. Julius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall's Legacy, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1252 (1992).
The NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the NAACP were separate entities, but the LDF's tax-
exempt status helped it obtain funds from tax savvy donors. Id. at 1253.
56. Id. at 1252.
57. See CHESTNUT, JR. & CASS, supra note 2, at 307.
58. 342 U.S. 350 (1952) (vacating judgment of federal district court that South Carolina's
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Brown v. Board of Education.
59
2. Arthur Shores
Arthur Shores was admitted to the Alabama bar in 1937. 60 No black
had been admitted to the bar in the preceding twenty years,, and so in the
black community, there was much ado about his passing the bar.
Mr. Shores was a native of Birmingham, having graduated from its
Industrial High School (now Parker High School). He did not travel very
far away for college, graduating from Talladega College in 1924. He
was first a teacher then the principal of Dunbar High School in Besse-
mer, Alabama. He was always interested in education and civil rights.
He was one of the founders of the Alabama State Teachers Association
and served as that group's secretary. In the early 1930s, he was elected
vice-president of the National Association of Teachers in Colored
Schools. Unlike the other two black lawyers in Birmingham, he was
very active in the NAACP, serving as treasurer of the Birmingham chap-
ter. Throughout the period of his teaching career, Mr. Shores was read-
ing the law, taking extension courses in law from LaSalle Extension
University of Chicago, and graduate courses at the University of Kan-
sas. 61 With a sigh of relief, Mr. Shores passed the bar exam in 1937.62 It
was entirely predictable that Arthur Shores would become a civil rights
lawyer. He opened a law office in the prestigious Masonic Temple
Building (the largest building owned by blacks in the country) on Bir-
mingham's famed Fourth Avenue in the heart of Birmingham's black
business district.
3. Fred Gray
The second Alabama lawyer who was a primary cooperating attor-
ney with the LDF during the operative period was Fred Gray. A native
constitutional and statutory provisions that required separate schools for children of white and
black American races did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregating children on the basis of race in public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
60. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 274-75, 306 n.35. For more biographical information about
Shores, see generally Annie Groer, The Hatred, the Dynamite. the Bullets ... Nothing Could Stop
Arthur D. Shores, BIOGRAPHY, Sept. 1997, at 86-91; A Pioneer Passes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1996, § I, at 24; Diane E. Galanis, Climbing the Mountain: Pioneer Black Lawyers Look Back, 77
A.B.A. J. 60 (Apr. 1991). Helen Shores Lee and Barbara Shores Martin are nearing completion of
the first biography on their father.
61. SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 274. Judge Walter B. Jones, at the behest of Arthur Shores'
father (who was a janitor in the building where the bar review course was taught to white bar
applicants), made arrangements to "review the basis of law with Shores in his chambers" apart
from his white students. Id. at 275.
62. Id. at 274.
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of Montgomery, Gray graduated from Alabama State University6' and
accepted State of Alabama tuition grants64 to attend law school at Case
Western Reserve in Cleveland.65 In 1954, Mr. Gray graduated from law
school and passed the Ohio and Alabama bars in the same year.6 He
returned to Montgomery with a passion to "destroy everything segre-
gated [he] could find. 6 7 As it turned out, Mr. Gray returned to Mont-
gomery shortly before the Montgomery Improvement Association, E.D.
Nixon, and a young upstart by the name of Martin Luther King, Jr., were
getting a bus boycott underway. 68 The LDF figured prominently in that
boycott and in the illustrious civil rights career of Fred Gray.69
III. THE LDF's INITIAL BATTLEGROUNDS
In Alabama and elsewhere, the LDF and cooperative attorneys
sought to reverse every vestige of segregation. This meant litigation of
great constitutional questions, from separate but equal, one person one
vote, to freedom of speech and association. They sought to dismantle
every component of American apartheid that had been sanctioned by the
United States Supreme Court for centuries.
A. Voting Rights
Between the period 1941-1970, voting rights were an ongoing and
paramount concern in the black community. The LDF was involved in
most, if not all, of the litigation during that period.70
One of the earliest LDF cases in Alabama was Mitchell v. Wright.
71
63. GRAY, supra note 2, at 309. Fred Gray has been the recipient of many awards from his
alma mater, including an honorary doctor of law degree given to him in 1990. Id.
64. Id. at 17-19. See generally ALA. CONST. art. XIV, § 256 (1975). Like many other South-
em states, Alabama had "out-of-state arrangements" for black American students who, except for
their race, were qualified to attend Alabama state schools. GRAY, supra note 2, at 17-19. Under
these arrangements, the state of Alabama would reimburse these students for certain school-
related expenses arising from their studies in another state, if the students could provide the mon-
ies initially. Id. Obviously, this hurdle was a disqualifier for many poor black Americans.
65. GRAY, supra note 2, at 30.
66. Id. at 32.
67. Id. at 19 (internal quotation omitted).
68. Id. at 38. Gray describes his opportunity to work with the Montgomery boycott as the
launch pad for his legal career. Id.
69. GRAY, supra note 2, at 36-38, 56.
70. See SMITH, JR., supra note 2, at 18. The LDF was involved in Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944), the "white primaries case," in which the United States Supreme Court stated that
blacks could vote in Southern primary elections. See also GRAY, supra note 2, at 116, 232. The
LDF was also involved in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the United States Supreme
Court case arising from the redrawing of the Tuskegee, Alabama, voting district, and Smith v.
Paris, 386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967), a class action for declaration of invalidity of an Alabama
democratic party county executive committee's resolution changing the method of selection of
committeemen. Sinith, 386 F.2d at 979.
71. 62 F. Supp. 580 (M.D. Ala. 1945), rev'd, 154 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S.
733 (1946).
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Until the Second Reconstruction, Macon County, with its eighty percent
black population, and Tuskegee Institute were always problematic for
the defenders of segregation.72 On July 5, 1945, William P. Mitchell, a
black man, applied to vote at the Macon County Courthouse. 73 He
brought with him two registered voters who would vouch for him, as
required of black applicants by the white Macon County registrars.74
After being forced to wait in a long line, the registrars refused to register
Mitchell to vote.75 On Mitchell's behalf, Arthur Shores and Thurgood
Marshall filed a class action in the Middle District of Alabama against
registrars Mrs. George C. Wright and Virgil Guthrie. 6
Judge Kennamer dismissed the complaint, finding that the plaintiff
had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies-circuit court, Ala-
bama Supreme Court-and that a class action would not be appropriate
since "[t]he question of unconstitutional discrimination in registration
cannot be determined by groups or classes but must be determined as to
each individual., 77 The Shores-Marshall team appealed to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which easily reversed and remanded the case back for trial.78
The LDF also challenged Alabama's "Boswell" Amendment
(adopted in 1945), which permitted registration only of persons who
could understand and explain any article of the Federal Constitution.79
This standard was so vague that registrars could accept or reject whom-
ever they pleased. In one county, although thirty-six percent of the
population was black American, only 104 blacks were registered, as
compared to 2,800 whites. 0 In striking down the statute, the district
court said: "We cannot ignore the impact of the Boswell Amendment
upon Negro citizens because it avoids mention of race or color; 'To do
this would be to shut our eyes to what all others than we can see and
understand.'".
In Sellers v. Wilson,82 Arthur Shores, Thurgood Marshall, and
Robert L. Carter brought suit on behalf of four blacks who sought to
register to vote in Bullock County. 3 On three separate occasions, their
clients had appeared at the courthouse and tried to register.8 4 They sat
apprehensively while all of the white applicants were being processed
72. GRAY, supra note 2, at 110-1I.




77. Id. at 582.
78. Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924, 927 (1946).
79. GRAY, supra note 2, at I11.
80. Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872, 876 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
81. Davis, 81 F. Supp. at 881 (citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936)).
82. 123 F. Supp. 917 (M.D. Ala. 1954).
83. Sellers, 123 F. Supp. at 918.
84. Id.
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and registered. 85 Each day, they would be told to come back the next
day. 86 They faithfully did so, and on each next day the board refused
them. 7 On the third day, after the whites had been registered and their
turn came at 11:30 a.m., the board chairman told them that he was going
to lunch and to come back at 1:00 p.m. 88 They did so, but they did not
see him until 2:30 p.m.89 They confronted him as he went to the base-
ment, and he told them that the board was not in session that afternoon,
that he was there alone and could do nothing for them.90 On these facts,
the court found that "[tihe acts of these defendants amounted to a denial
of their request, a denial occasioned solely because the plaintiffs were
members of the Negro race."9' The court granted the injunctive relief
(prospectively, since the members of the board of registrars had re-
signed). 92
The Macon County problem was highlighted most vividly in the
landmark LDF case, Gomillion v. Lightfoot,93 the infamous sea dragon
case.94 As of 1956, the City of Tuskegee had been square in shape.95 The
following year, the Alabama Legislature enacted a bill sponsored by
State Senator Sam Englehardt, Jr., who was also the executive secretary
of the White Citizens Council of Alabama.96 This legislation, Local Act
140, 97 transformed, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, "the shape of
Tuskegee from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure,, 98 thus
the sea dragon. As a practical matter, this sea dragon reduced the num-
ber of black voters in the City of Tuskegee from four hundred to about
four or five, leaving all of the white voters within the new city limits.99
On behalf of Tuskegee Civic Association President and Tuskegee
Institute Dean of Students Dr. C.G. Gomillion and eleven others, Fred
Gray, Arthur Shores, and LDF's Robert Carter filed a federal class ac-
tion to have the Act declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments." °° Based on the "political question" doctrine,
Judge Frank Johnson summarily dismissed the case.'0 ' On appeal, by a
85. Id. at 919.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Sellers, 123 F. Supp. at 919.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 920.
92. Id.
93. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
94. GRAY, supra note 2, at 115.
95. Id. at 115-16.
96. Id. at75, 115.
97. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 340.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 341.
100. GRAY, supra note 2, at 3-4.
101. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 167 F. Supp. 405, 410 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
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split decision (Judge John R. Brown, dissenting), Judge Johnson's deci-
sion was affirmed. 0 2 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unani-
mously reversed the lower courts, observing:
[The plaintiffs'] allegations, if proven, would abundantly estab-
lish that Act 140 was not an ordinary geographic redistricting
measure even within familiar abuses of gerrymandering. If these
allegations upon a trial remained uncontradicted or unqualified,
the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical
purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is
solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by
fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their
pre-existing municipal vote.
It is difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of adjudg-
ing a statute having this inevitable effect invalid in light of the
principles by which this Court must judge, and uniformly has
judged, statutes that, howsoever speciously defined, obviously
discriminate against colored citizens. "The [Fifteenth] Amend-
ment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination."
The complaint amply alleges a claim of racial discrimination.
Against this claim the respondents have never suggested, either
in their brief or in oral argument, any countervailing municipal
function which Act 140 is designed to serve.
In sum, as Mr. Justice Holmes remarked, when dealing with a
related situation[:] . . . "Of course the petition concerns political
action," but "The objection that the subject-matter of the suit is
political is little more than a play upon words." A statute which
is alleged to have worked unconstitutional deprivations of peti-
tioner' rights is not immune to attack simply because the mecha-
nism employed by the legislature is a redefinition of municipal
boundaries. According to the allegations here made, the Ala-
bama Legislature has not merely redrawn the Tuskegee city lim-
its with incidental inconvenience to the petitioners; it is more
accurate to say that it has deprived the petitioners of the munici-
pal franchise and consequent rights and to that end it has inci-
dentally changed the city's boundaries. While in form this is
merely an act redefining metes and bounds, if the allegations are
established, the inescapable human effect of this essay in
geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens, and only
colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights ....
When a State exercises power wholly within the domain of
state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But
such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as
102. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 598-99 (5th Cir. 1959).
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an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right. t03
Fred Gray describes his experience in arguing Gomillion:
I argued first.
As I began, the Chief Justice wanted to know the meaning of
the map. I explained that behind me was a map of the City of
Tuskegee .showing the old city limits with the new city limits
superimposed thereon. Justice Frankfurter immediately asked,
"Where is Tuskegee Institute? I know it is still in the City of
Tuskegee." I pointed out to Mr. Justice Frankfurter where Tus-
kegee Institute was on the map. I told him that Tuskegee Insti-
tute was gerrymandered outside the city limits.
He said, "You mean to tell me that Tuskegee Institute is out-
side the city limits of the City of Tuskegee? I said, "Yes, sir, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter." I believe that was the determining factor in
getting Frankfurter's vote.t°4
The Gomillion case is still a leading case in constitutional law, lay-
ing the foundation for both the "one-person, one-vote" principle in Rey-
nolds v. Sims'05 and the justiciability of redistricting cases expounded in
Baker v. Carr.
t0 6
The LDF's legal participation in the Selma voting efforts and dem-
onstrations is well documented. 0 7 Its mission was to get the would-be
registrants out of jail as fast as Sheriff Jim Clark could put them in,
which meant filing removal petitions in federal courts in the afternoon
after blacks had been arrested in the morning merely for standing in line
to register to vote. 08 For example, in Clark v. Boynton, t0 9 Judge Daniel
Thomas found Sheriff Clark, a white sheriff, in contempt of court for
inhumane treatment of black demonstrators and imposed a fine of
$1,500.'0 The opinion reflects the determination and relative success of
the LDF and its cooperating Alabama lawyers."'
103. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341-42, 347 (internal citations omitted).
104. GRAY, supra note 2, at 121.
105. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
106. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
107. GRAY, supra note 2, at 221. See also CHESTNUT, JR. & CASS, supra note 2, at 192-93.
108. GRAY, supra note 2, at 200.
109. 362 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1966).
110. Clark, 362 F.2d at 993.
1ll. Id. at 995. Judge Thomas found, inter alia:
The demonstrators were not disorderly. About 2:30 p.m., Sheriff Clark and his
deputies ordered the group to disperse. The group refused, so they were taken on a
"forced march." The group was forced to either run or walk at a brisk pace for over
four miles. Sheriff Clark and his deputies rode in cars, taking turns walking and
conducting the march with posse men. Sheriff Clark himself was in a car at all
times while the march was occurring. Several members of the group marching were
struck with a cattle prod on the march.
2001] 1137
Alabama Law Review
The LDF's participation in the Selma movement culminated in Wil-
liams v. Wallace, 12 filed the day after marchers were beaten on the Ed-
mund Pettus Bridge on Sunday, March 7, 1965." 3 In Williams, Judge
Johnson's order, based on a plan presented by LDF attorneys, permitted
the Selma-to-Montgomery march to take place."14 In addition to granting
the demonstrators the right to march, Judge Johnson's order also re-
strained the Alabama police "and all those in active concert or participa-
tion with them, from intimidating, threatening, coercing or interfering
with the proposed march .. .""' This march served as one of the major
catalysts to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.116
B. School Desegregation
To further ensure black caste, political exclusion was coupled with
educational disadvantage. Black schools were neglected institutionally
to allocate more resources for white schools. The LDF made ending seg-
regation in education one of its most important aims.
The jewel in the LDF's crown is Brown v. Board of Education."
7
This decision was shaped by nearly two decades of litigation and an
evolving legal strategy to overturn the "separate but equal" doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson."' That strategy began with the teacher salary
equalization suits, continued with college and graduate school desegre-
gation, and ended with lawsuits to desegregate the elementary and sec-
ondary schools. LDF litigation in Alabama mirrored that strategy.
In 1942, Arthur Shores and Thurgood Marshall filed a class action
lawsuit on behalf of William J. Bolden to equalize black and white
teacher salaries in the public schools of Jefferson County."19 The case
was settled by a consent decree, entered in 1945, under which the county
school board agreed to pay equal salaries to its black and white teach-
ers. 20 Newspaper articles that were found in the personal papers of Ar-
thur Shores reflect that two years later, in 1947, Ruby Jackson Gainer,
local activist and sister of Emory 0. Jackson-the venerable editor of
Id.
112. 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).
113. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 102, 104.
114. GRAY, supra note 2, at 221-22.
115. Williams, 240 F. Supp. at 109.
116. GRAY, supra note 2, at 225. After "Bloody Sunday," President Lyndon B. Johnson pub-
licly denounced the treatment of the marchers and pushed for passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. See id. at 350. Throughout the period 1965-1970, LDF lawyers, working with Alabama
attorneys such as Oscar Adams, Peter Hall, Demetrius Newton, and Orzell Billingsley, were in-
volved in defending demonstrators and bringing some of the earliest cases under the Voting
Rights Act.
117. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
118. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
119. Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559, 560 (N.D. Ala. 1955).
120. Gainer, 135 F. Supp. at 560-61.
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the Birmingham World,--was fired by the board after she filed a petition
asking the court to hold the board in contempt for violating the decree.
Messrs. Shores and Marshall persuaded the Jefferson County Circuit
Court to reinstate her.
Meanwhile, in 1947, Judge Lynne appointed a special master, attor-
ney Reid Barnes, to investigate and recommend findings of fact and
conclusions of law as to whether the Jefferson County School Board had
discriminated in the payment of salaries on the basis of race against its
black American teachers and principals.1 2' Little more than six years
later, on September 16, 1953, Mr. Barnes made his report.122 Judge
Lynne issued his decision two years later, on November 4, 1955.123 The
special master found that in fact the school board had continued to pay
differential salaries to its black and white teachers. 2 4 The court
[agreed] with the master, for the reasons so ably stated by him,
that differentials in the salaries paid white and Negro teachers in
the "bachelor approved" class represented results of arbitrary
discrimination, though without bad or evil motive, and holding
that, in the final analysis, they were predicated solely on race or
color, the Court concludes that a case for civil contempt has
been made out.1
25
The court then proceeded to ask what proved to be a rhetorical ques-
tion: "May the Court assess a fine against the Board in the amount of
$2,970 to compensate the parties-plaintiff in the offended class for sala-
ries lost as a result of its disobedience of the injunction?"'1 6 The court
labored mightily over this issue, considering the law both ex contractu
and ex delicto.12 7 Not surprisingly, the court found that it could not
compensate the plaintiffs by way of a fine against the contumacious de-
fendant, despite United States Supreme Court precedent to the con-
trary.
128
While Gainer was pending, Arthur Shores and Thurgood Marshall
proceeded to the next level in the strategy for overturning Plessy: the
desegregation of Alabama's institutions of higher learning. Those efforts
commenced in 1950, when Mr. Shores' brother-in-law and some-time
business partner, Wilbur H. Hollins, sought application papers from The
121. Id. at 562.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 559.
124. Id. at 566.
125. Gainer, 135 F. Supp. at 566.
126. Id. at 566.
127. Id. at 567-70.
128. Id. at 567. But see McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193-94 (1949), and
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947). In these two cases, the
United States Supreme Court reached precisely the opposite conclusion.
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University of Alabama School of Law.12 9 As Judge Grooms wrote five
years later:
The defendants furnished him an application, but the accompa-
nying letter stated that the State had provided machinery
"through the State Department of Education to assist colored
students who desired to engage in the study of law to obtain op-
portunities for entering high grade institutions located elsewhere
which accept colored students." Defendants concluded the letter
by stating that "We hope you can persuade yourself not to file
your application for admission here." 3
Apparently, Hollins was sufficiently persuaded and thereafter contented
himself with a career in real estate.
The opportunity to move to the next level of the strategy presented
itself in the Autherine Lucy case, a defining case in the life of this
state.' 3' Autherine Lucy and Polly Myers received baccalaureate degrees
from Miles College in Birmingham in June 1952.132 They decided to
attend graduate school at The University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa.'
33
At the time, the University was Alabama's undisputed premier flag-
ship university-for whites only. '34 Black Alabamians wanting to attend
state-supported institutions of higher learning were confined to Alabama
State College in Montgomery and Alabama A&M University in Hunts-
ville. 35 To comply with Plessy, if a black student wanted to take a col-
lege, graduate, or professional course not offered at Alabama State or
Alabama A&M, the State of Alabama would pay the difference between
tuition and boarding at the University or Auburn University and the tui-
tion and boarding at the university of the black student's choosing, any-
where in the United States, plus travel. 36 But rather than going to Yale
to study library science or to Columbia to study journalism, Autherine
Lucy and Polly Myers, respectively, decided that they wanted to study
those subjects at their own state's flagship-The University of Ala-
bama.
37
On September 4, 1952, they both applied to the University. Within
129. Lucy v. Adams, 134 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ala.) (discussing Hollins' treatment when he ap-
plied to The University of Alabama School of Law), aff'd, 228 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 931 (1956).
130. Lucy, 134 F. Supp. at 238.
131. Id. at 325.
132. Id. at 237.
133. Id.
134. GRAY, supranote2, at 194.
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id. at 18-19.
137. Lucy, 134 F. Supp. at 237.
138. Id.
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a week, they were advised that they had been accepted and to send in
their five dollar room reservation fee.' 39 They duly complied, and the
University advised them on September 10, 1952, that they were assigned
to the Adams-Parker dormitory. 40 Three days later, University President
Gallalee wrote both of them and assured that they would be welcomed
on the campus.
1 41
But when they arrived on campus ten days later, Lucy and Myers
were refunded their room reservation deposits and advised that the
courses they sought were available at Alabama State College in Mont-
gomery.142 Their applications to attend the University were rejected and
their appeal to President Gallalee was to no avail. 43 President Gallalee
contacted a party in Birmingham and asked him to intervene with Arthur
Shores and have him persuade Lucy and Myers to withdraw their appli-
cations and to enroll at Alabama State or Tuskegee. 144
Undaunted, Shores then wrote to the Governor, the president-ex of-
ficio of the University's Board of Trustees, requesting assistance. 45
Governor Persons responded by placing the applications on the agenda
of the next annual meeting of the board-in June of the following
year! 46 On June 6, 1953, the Board of Trustees deferred action on the
applications, pending the anticipated decision of the Supreme Court in
Brown. 47 Its secretary informed Mr. Shores of the board's action, the
board's note that Alabama State College and Tuskegee Institute offered
courses in library science and journalism, and of the board's suggestion
that his clients "make application to those institutions.' 48
Having handled the leading cases on point, Messrs. Marshall and
Shores filed the lawsuit in federal court. 49 On October 9, 1953, Judge
Grooms dismissed the case, without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to
file an amended complaint. 5° The appeal was dismissed as premature.' 5,




142. Lucy, 134 F. Supp. at 237-38.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 237.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Lucy, 134 F. Supp. at 237. Of course, what the Board of Trustees of the University did
was to blissfully ignore the law. It was not open to question in 1952 whether Lucy and Myers
could be denied or deferred admission to the University because of their race. From Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), to Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948),
culminating in Siveatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Supreme Court had made it perfectly
clear that states could not segregate its graduate and professional schools based on race.
148. Lucy, 134 F. Supp. at 238 (internal quotation omitted).
149. GRAY, supra note 2, at 192.
150. Lucy v. Board of Trustees, 213 F.2d 846, 847 (5th Cir. 1954).
151. Lucy, 213 F. Supp. at 847.
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Trustees did not resurrect the applications of Lucy and Myers. A full
year and two weeks after Brown, again as found by Judge Grooms:
[O]ne Agnes Stoudemire wrote Dr. Carmichael, President, stat-
ing that she was desirous of taking some courses at the Univer-
sity Extension Center in Birmingham; that she was a Negro and
would like to know whether or not the policy had changed for
the admission of Negroes so that she might be accepted as a stu-
dent. Dr. Carmichael replied to this letter, advising her that "the
admission requirements of the University of Alabama have not
changed in recent months."
' 52
On further motion by Messrs. Shores and Marshall, Judge Grooms
found that although there was no written policy or rule excluding blacks
from the University, there was a tacit policy to that effect.'53 On July 1,
1955, he enjoined the University from denying Lucy, Myers, or other
similarly situated blacks "the right to enroll in the University of Ala-
bama and pursue courses of study, solely on account of their race or
color."'
54
The University did not give up. It appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
which affirmed Judge Grooms in a three-paragraph per curiam opin-
ion. 
155
On December 30, 1955, the district court ordered the University to
admit Lucy for the second semester, commencing on February 3,
1956.156 She did enroll at The University of Alabama at that time, be-
coming the first known black ever to do so. 57 Her tenure there was
short-lived, however. Despite the denial of dormitory space and dining
hall privileges to her by the Board of Trustees, she attended three days
of classes.'58 On the third day, February 6, 1956, she was attacked by a
mob.' 59 That night, the board met and voted to exclude her from attend-
ing classes "until further notice."' 60 On February 29, Judge Grooms held
a hearing on the contempt petition filed by Messrs. Shores and Mar-
shall.' 6' He thereafter ordered the University to terminate the order of
152. Lucy, 134 F. Supp. at 238. It is probably no coincidence that Agnes Stoudemire was Ar-
thur Shores' secretary at the time of her letter of inquiry.
153. Id. at 239.
154. Id.
155. Adams v. Lucy, 228 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1955).
156. For the fullest account of the Autherine Lucy saga, see generally E. CULPEPPER CLARK,
THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR: SEGREGATION'S LAST STAND AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA
(1993).
157. See id. at 57-59.
158. Id. at 58.
159. Seeid. at71-77.
160. Id. at 79.
161. CLARK, supra note 156, at 99.
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suspension or exclusion by March 5.62 But by March 5, the University
had permanently expelled Lucy for statements her lawyers had made in
their contempt petition. 63 Judge Grooms upheld the suspension.
President Carmichael's lamentations in explaining why the Univer-
sity had to admit Autherine Lucy is a testament to the tenacity of the
LDF and Arthur Shores:
The court case . . . had been in litigation for three and a half
years. During that period the Board of Trustees sought through
all legal means to maintain the historic tradition of segregation
which they conscientiously believed to be in the best interests of
all concerned .... Finally, when the last legal battle was decided
adversely the trustees were faced with two alternatives, yielding
to the court's decree or defying the law.'6 4
Six years elapsed between the time of Autherine Lucy's expulsion
and the admission of LDF-sponsored Vivian J. Malone and Jimmy A.
Hood to The University of Alabama. Despite a defiant governor's "stand
in the schoolhouse door," the injunction obtained by Arthur Shores and
the LDF in Lucy proved to be more powerful than the governor. 65 Since
1963, blacks have attended the University in ever-increasing numbers.
1 66
The desegregation of Alabama's other flagship institution, Auburn
Polytechnic Institute, now known as Auburn University, was less dra-
matic. Fred Gray and LDF lawyers Constance Baker Motley and Leroy
Clark represented Harold Franklin in this undertaking. 67
In 1962, Franklin, a graduate of Alabama State College, applied for
admission to the graduate school at Auburn.168 He was denied admission
on the ostensible ground that his undergraduate degree was awarded by
an unaccredited institution. 169 The ensuing litigation was assigned to
Judge Frank Johnson of the Middle District of Alabama. 70 Judge John-
son spoke directly and forcefully to the issue presented:
Franklin was rejected on one basis: He had not been graduated
from a college that held an accredited status with the Southern
Association of Colleges and Schools. Thus the State of Alabama
162. Id. at 102.
163. GRAY, supra note 2, at 192.
164. United States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137, 1141 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
165. GRAY, supra note 2, at 193-94.
166. Id. at 194. The University of Alabama is reported to have "one of the highest percentages
of African-American student enrollment of any predominantly white Southern university." Id.
167. Id. at 196.
168. Id. at 195.
169. GRAY, supra note 2, at 196.
170. Franklin v. Parker, 223 F. Supp. 724 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
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has denied to Harold A. Franklin, a Negro-solely because he is
a Negro-the opportunity to receive an undergraduate education
at an accredited state college or university; at the same time, the
State of Alabama afforded adequate opportunity to its white citi-
zens to receive an undergraduate education at accredited State
institutions. Now, after having done this, the State of Alabama,
acting through its State operated and maintained institution Au-
burn University, insists that graduate education at that institution
shall be open only to students who are graduates of accredited
colleges or universities. On its face, and standing alone, the re-
quirement of Auburn University concerning graduation from an
accredited institution as a prerequisite to being admitted to
Graduate School is unobjectionable and a reasonable rule for a
college or university to adopt. However, the effect of this rule
upon Harold Franklin-an Alabama Negro-and others in his
class who may be similarly situated, is necessarily to preclude
him from securing a postgraduate education at Auburn Univer-
sity solely because the State of Alabama discriminated against
him in its undergraduate schools. Such racial discrimination on
the part of the State of Alabama amounts to a clear denial of the
equal protection of the laws. This is true regardless of the good
motives or purposes that Auburn University may have concern-
ing the rule in question.'
71
Auburn was ordered to admit Franklin, and it did so.
72
Governor George Corley Wallace, as chairman of the Auburn Board
of Trustees, then intervened. Largely because of his intervention, Au-
burn refused to assign dormitory space to Franklin, even though space
was admittedly available. 73 On application by Fred Gray, Judge Johnson
ordered that the dormitory space be provided forthwith.' 74 Auburn com-
plied, and Franklin was duly enrolled as a graduate student on January 2,
1964.17
It is fair to say that the LDF has been involved in all of the public
school desegregation cases in Alabama. Starting with suits against indi-
vidual school boards in Birmingham, Montgomery, Jefferson County,
Mobile, and Huntsville, and culminating in Fred Gray's Lee v. Macon
County176 case, the LDF and cooperating Alabama lawyers had brought
an end to all officially segregated schools in this state by 1974.
171. Franklin, 223 F. Supp. at 726.
172. Id. at 727-28. See also GRAY, supra note 2, at 196-97.
173. United States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (N.D. Ala. 1985).
174. United States v. Alabama, 628 F. Supp. at 1144.
175. Id.
176. 289 F. Supp. 975 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (consolidating 99 school systems under court order in
which Judge Frank Johnson denied petition to modernize certain classrooms at predominately
black American schools).
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C. Employment Cases
While tackling education and voting injustices, the LDF also ad-
dressed racial discrimination in Alabama's employment practices. Thur-
good Marshall's professor and mentor, Charles Houston, worked with
Arthur Shores in one of the most important and widely-cited cases in the
field of labor law: Steele v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. '77
Bester William Steele, a black resident of Birmingham, had worked
as a fireman for thirty years at L & N Railroad as of 1940. He and other
black firemen were not permitted to join the all-white Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, which represented the bargaining
unit under the Railway Labor Act.17 1 In 1940, purporting to act as the
representative of all firemen, the Brotherhood entered into an agreement
that would ultimately exclude all "non-promotables" (i.e., blacks) from
serving as* firemen. 79 By supplemental agreement, not more than fifty
percent of the firemen in each seniority unit could be blacks, and the
seniority rights of the "non-promotables" were severely restricted.8
The black firemen were not given notice of these changes before they
became effective.' 8 ' When Steele was laid off for sixteen days and then
assigned to a less desirable job because of these changes in the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, he came to Arthur Shores.
Mr. Shores filed in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, a suit that
was summarily dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. 18 2 The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. 8 3 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
8 4 Charlie Houston argued the case.1
85
The Supreme Court held unanimously that the Railway Labor Act'
8 6
imposed a duty on a labor union, acting under authority of the statute as
the exclusive bargaining representative of workers, to represent all the
employees in the craft or class of employees without discrimination be-
cause of race. 187 Chief Justice Stone wrote for the Court:
Congress, in enacting the Railway Labor Act and authorizing a
labor union, chosen by a majority of a craft, to represent the
craft, did not intend to confer plenary power upon the union to
sacrifice, for the benefit of its members, rights of the minority of
177. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).




182. Id. at 198.
183. Steele, 323 U.S. at 198.
184. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 322 U.S. 722 (1944).
185. Steele, 323 U.S. at 193.
186. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-63, 181-88 (1994).
187. Steele, 323 U.S. at 202-03.
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the craft, without imposing on it any duty to protect the minor-
ity. Since petitioner and the other Negro members of the craft
are not members of the Brotherhood or eligible for membership,
the authority to act for them is derived not from their action or
consent but wholly from the command of the Act .... We think
that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory represen-
tative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the
interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes
upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of
those for whom it legislates. Congress has seen fit to clothe the
bargaining representative with powers comparable to those pos-
sessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights
of those whom it represents, . . . , but it has also imposed on the
representative a corresponding duty. We hold that the language
of the Act to which we have referred, read in the light of the
purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Congress to impose on
the bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the
duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of
all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against
them.'88
Steele is notable as one of the first instances where the Supreme
Court read a federal statute to impose on a private entity the duty not to
discriminate on the basis of race. Justice Murphy would have gone fur-
ther and held that the Constitution would be violated by a private asso-
ciation that had been given authority by Congress to engage in racial
discrimination. 8 9 He concluded:
The Constitution voices its disapproval whenever economic dis-
crimination is applied under authority of law against any race,
creed or color. A sound democracy cannot allow such discrimi-
nation to go unchallenged. Racism is far too virulent today to
permit the slightest refusal, in the light of a Constitution that ab-
hors it, to expose and condemn it wherever it appears in the
course of a statutory interpretation.190
The LDF and its Alabama cooperating lawyers were also at the fore-
front in the development of Title VII law. Among their more important
cases are Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.,19' United States v.
United States Steel Corp. ,192 Swint v. Pullman-Standard,193 Huff v. N.D.
188. Id. at 199, 202-03 (internal citation omitted).
189. See id. at 208-09 (Murphy, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 209 (Murphy, J., concurring).
191. 332 F. Supp. 811 (N.D. Ala. 1970) (holding that limiting membership on board of opera-
tives to whites violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
192. 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (holding that seniority system and lines of promotion
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Cass Co., t94 and Burns v. Thiokol Chemical Corp.19 5 LDF litigation in
the steel industry lead to a decree that affected steelworkers throughout
the nation and reformed the steel industry.
196
D. Other Areas
This Article is too brief to explore all the original cases that the LDF
and cooperating attorneys brought to end segregation. Yet, a few other
illustrations are essential.
1. Housing
Monk v. City of Birmingham97 involved a challenge of a 1926 Bir-
mingham ordinance making it a misdemeanor for a person to move into,
for the purpose of establishing a "permanent residence" (i.e., for more
than twenty-four hours), "an area of the City of Birmingham generally
and historically recognized at the time as an area for occupancy by
members of the [opposite] race."'198 Mary Means Monk was denied a
permit to build a house on what is now "Dynamite Hill,"1 99 a Birming-
ham community earning its name for the numerous bombings occurring
there after its transition from majority white to majority black.
Arthur Shores and Birmingham attorneys Peter Hall and David
Hood, along with Thurgood Marshall, filed a class action in the North-
ern District of Alabama. 200 They presented their proof to Chief Judge
Mullins. After judicially noticing the ordinances and finding that Mary
Monk had paid $2000 for the property and another $2000 for plans and
specifications to a contractor, Judge Mullins found that the City of Bir-
mingham denied her application for a building permit solely because she
proposed to build in an area zoned for whites. 20 ' He concluded that he
had no choice but to follow the law as interpreted by the Supreme
of company violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), vacated in part, appeal dismissed
in part, 520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
193. 539 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976) (vacating judgment of district court that employer had made
prima facie case that its seniority system was in compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964), revId, 624 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
194. 468 F.2d 172 (5th Cir.1972) (affirming opinion of district court that employer had not
discharged minority employee for racial reasons, but had dismissed employee for poor quality of
work), reh "g en bane, 485 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1973).
195. 483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973) (reversing decision of district court and remanding for new
trial on the basis that discoverable employment records were not provided to plaintiff in employ-
ment action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 63 F.R.D. I (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff'd,
517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975).
197. 87 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
198. Monk, 87 F. Supp. at 539.
199. Seeid. at540.
200. Id. at 538.
201. Id. at 540.
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Prior to 1960, the LDF, along with Fred Gray, instituted the lawsuit
that brought an end to segregation in Montgomery buses and, thus, a
successful end to the bus boycott.20 3 The late Oscar W. Adams, and De-
metrius C. Newton, filed a similar lawsuit in the Birmingham federal
court.2 0 4 The Court of Appeals had no such difficulty.2 0 5 The Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Browder ended, once and for all, any
argument that Plessy v. Ferguson and the "separate but equal" doctrine
had any further life.
When the freedom rides hit Alabama, the LDF was there. In addition
to defending the riders, the LDF, again with Fred Gray, filed Lewis v.
Greyhound Corp.a°6 and obtained an injunction against the bus company
and local and state law enforcement officials ordering an end to en-
forcement of segregation on the buses and in bus terminals.20 7 The LDF
was also in Birmingham in 1963 defending the demonstrators at all lev-
els. Virtually all of the convictions were eventually thrown out by the
Supreme Court in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham.a0t
202. Id. at 544. The district court judge stated:
But it is my duty to follow the three decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States conclusively holding municipal zoning ordinances based on race or color,
such as those here involved, unconstitutional and void as being violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment....
Under the decisions it becomes my duty to declare each of the three ordinances
here involved unconstitutional, as being violative of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and to issue an injunction against the further enforcement of the same.
Monk, 87 F. Supp. at 544.
203. Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
204. Baldwin v. Morgan, 149 F. Supp. 224, 224-25 (N.D. Ala. 1957), rev'd, 251 F.2d 780 (5th
Cir. 1958). The district judge was at a loss to understand the complaint of racial segregation in
Birmingham's Terminal Station:
This is but another in the growing list of cases wherein both the tutored and the un-
tutored apparently entertain the mistaken notion that the proper function of the fed-
eral courts is propaganda rather than judicature. They who espouse the theory that
such courts should essay the roles of super legislatures know not what they do.
In vain, the court has searched the allegations of the complaint for a definitive
statement of facts, showing "that there is a substantial controversy, between [plain-
tiffs and defendants] of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of
a declaratory judgment."
Baldwin, 149 F. Supp. at 224-25 (citations omitted).
205. Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780, 784-85 (5th Cir. 1958).
206. 199 F. Supp. 210 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
207. Lewis, 199 F. Supp. at 216-17.
208. 394 U.S. 147 (1969) (reversing conviction of participant in Good Friday march). But see
Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (upholding conviction of marchers for violating
court order prohibiting march).
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3. Freedom of Association
Two vital constitutional law cases came about as a result of the
LDF's noble fight to ensure the right of the NAACP to operate in Ala-
bama. In an effort to appeal to and appease the white racists in this state,
Attorney General John Patterson brought suit in 1956 to ban the
NAACP, a membership organization incorporated in New York, from
Alabama for its failure to register with the Alabama Secretary of State
as a foreign corporation.0 9 Patterson alleged that the NAACP's activi-
ties here were inimical to the well-being of Alabama citizens.2 0 On the
day the complaint was filed, Patterson's office obtained an ex parte in-
junction from the Montgomery Circuit Court barring the NAACP from
conducting any business in Alabama and from attempting to qualify to
do business there.21  The injunction shut down the NAACP in Alabama.
Makeshift organizations sprang up-for example, The Alabama Chris-
tian Movement for Human Rights.212
Meanwhile, the circuit court ordered the NAACP to produce, inter
alia, its Alabama membership lists. 213 Realizing the catastrophic, per-
haps fatal, implications of such production, the NAACP wisely re-
fused.2 14 It was promptly adjudged to be in contempt of court and fined
$100,000.215 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the contempt or-
der.
21 6
Arthur Shores, Thurgood Marshall, and Bob Carter handled the con-
tempt aspect of the case.217 On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Harlan wrote for a unanimous Court on the issue of con-
stitutional standing:
If petitioner's rank-and-file members are constitutionally enti-
tled to withhold their connection with the Association despite
the production order, it is manifest that this right is properly as-
sertable by the Association. To require that it be claimed by the
members themselves would result in nullification of the right at
the very moment of its assertion. Petitioner is the appropriate
party to assert these rights, because it and its members are in
209. GRAY, supra note 2, at 106.
210. Id. at 105-06.
211. Id. at 106-07.
212. Id. at 107. See Civil Rights in Birmingham 1956-1963 (visited Mar. 22, 2001)
<http:llwww.sage.edu/RSC/programs/globcommdivision/studentslcivil.html>. See generally
ANDREW M. MANIS, A FIRE YOU CAN'T PUT OUT: THE CIVIL RIGHTS LIFE OF BIRMINGHAM'S
REVEREND FRED SHUTTLESWORTH (1999).
213. GRAY, supra note 2, at 106.
214. Id. at 107.
215. Id.
216. Exparte NAACP, 91 So. 2d 220, 221 (Ala. 1956).
217. Exparte NAACP, 91 So. 2d at 220.
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every practical sense identical. The Association, which provides
in its constitution that "[a]ny person who is in accordance with
[its] principles and policies . . ." may become a member, is but
the medium through which its individual members seek to make
more effective the expression of their own views. The reason-
able likelihood that the Association itself through diminished fi-
nancial support and membership may be adversely affected if
production is compelled is a further factor pointing towards our
holding that petitioner has standing to complain of the produc-
tion order on behalf of its members.218
The Court went on to hold that compelled production of the
NAACP's membership lists was an unconstitutional restraint on freedom
of association.1 9 It noted the uncontroverted showing that in the past,
revelation of the identity of NAACP members had exposed them to eco-
nomic reprisals, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and
"other manifestations of public hostility., 220 The Court found it apparent
that compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely
to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue
their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the
right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the
Association and dissuade others from joining it because of fear of expo-
sure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the conse-
quences of this exposure.2 2'
The Supreme Court's holding in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son established the enduring constitutional sanctity from state scrutiny
of the membership lists of an association such as the NAACP, absent a
compelling state interest.
222
The vacature of the contempt order by the Alabama courts was not
as easy as the Supreme Court had imagined. It took two additional trips
to the Supreme Court over a seven-year period before the merits of the
NAACP's ban could be addressed.223 By the time of the second grant of
certiorari, Fred Gray, Peter Hall, and Orzell Billingsley had joined the
team.224
With the Supreme Court breathing down its neck, the Montgomery
circuit court on December 29, 1961, entered a final decree and perma-
218. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958).
219. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 462-63.
222. Id. at 461.
223. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 360 U.S. 240, 244 (1959) (foreclosing the state
from shifting grounds as a basis for upholding the contempt order); NAACP v. Gallion, 368 U.S.
16 (1961) (requiring the federal district court to entertain the action unless the state courts had
granted a hearing on the merits by January 2, 1962).
224. Exparte NAACP, 122 So. 2d 396, 397 (Ala. 1960).
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nent injunction banning the NAACP from doing business in Alabama.2
The Alabama Supreme Court summarily affirmed fourteen months
later.226
Suffice it to say that the United States Supreme Court gave short
shrift to each of Alabama's arguments. It found no case, and the Ala-
bama Attorney General referenced none, in which a corporation was
ousted from Alabama for failing to comply with the registration stat-
ute. 27 It proceeded to find that "[t]he other asserted grounds for exclud-
ing [the NAACP] from Alabama furnish no better foundation for the
action below. 228 Justice Harlan's opinion concludes:
There is no occasion in this case for us to consider how much
survives of the principle that a State can impose such conditions
as it chooses on the right of a foreign corporation to do business
within the State, or can exclude it from the State altogether. This
case, in truth, involves not the privilege of a corporation to do
business in a State, but rather the freedom of individuals to asso-
ciate for the collective advocacy of ideas. Freedoms such as...
[this] are protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack,
but also from being stifled by more subtle government interfer-
ence.
22 9
Thanks to the LDF, Bob Carter, Arthur Shores, Fred Gray, Peter
Hall, and Orzell Billingsley, the NAACP has operated in this state now
for four decades. 3 °
225. NAACP v. State, 150 So. 2d 677, 678 (Ala. 1966). The injunction was based, among
other things, on the NAACP's activities in employing or paying money to Autherine Lucy and
Polly Myers to enroll at The University of Alabama; organizing, supporting, and financing the
Montgomery bus boycott; making false charges against officials of the State and The University
of Alabama; attempting to pressure Pennsylvania football officials and the Penn State football
team to boycott the Alabama football team when they played in the Liberty Bowl; and encourag-
ing a course of conduct seeking to deny Alabamians the right to "voluntarily segregate." NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 302-03 (1964). Of course, it was also based on the
NAACP's alleged "carr[ying] on its activities in Alabama without complying with state laws
requiring foreign corporations to register and perform other acts in order to do business within the
State." Id. at 303.
226. NAACP v. State, 150 So. 2d at 683.
227. Flowers, 377 U.S. at 306.
228. See GRAY, supra note 2, at 105-09.
229. Id. at 309-10 (citations omitted).
230. Id. at 105-09. Considerations of time and paper will not permit us to do justice to the
LDF's significant involvement in other aspects of civil rights law in Alabama.
For example, prior to the banning of the death penalty in the seminal LDF case Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the LDF monitored each death penalty case in Alabama, and as the
key contact for Alabama between 1969 and 1972, it was Judge Clemon's responsibility to see to it
that no one was executed in this state.
When the Fifth Circuit was proposed to be split in 1977 by placing the conservative judges in
Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida in one circuit, and the liberal judges in Louisiana and
Texas in a separate circuit, it was the LDF that stepped in and organized the opposition that ulti-
mately prevented it. See DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE




The brick foundation of civil and constitutional rights laid by the
LDF in Alabama soil is yet strong and secure. Thurgood Marshall, Ar-
thur Shores, Fred Gray, and the civil rights lawyers who followed in
their footsteps between 1940-1980 always instinctively and intuitively
sought out and found whatever straw was needed, and they utilized that
straw to create the brick foundation on which today we all stand at vari-
ous times. Thus, we all owe an unending gratitude to the LDF and its
cooperating attorneys in Alabama.
Of course, racial, sexual, national origin, religious, disability, and
religious discrimination have not somehow miraculously evaporated
from the atmosphere in Alabama since 1980. Such cases still dominate
the civil trial dockets in federal courts.
For those lawyers who are so inclined, there is much work to be
done in the tradition of the LDF, Thurgood Marshall, Arthur Shores, and
Fred Gray.
When the rape trial of the retarded Tommy Lee Hines was transferred from Morgan County to
Cullman County for trial, it was the LDF that intervened on his behalf. Hines v. State, 384 So. 2d
1171 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert denied, 384 So. 2d 1184 (Ala. 1980). The LDF sponsored the case
that established the principle that black witnesses need not respond to a prosecutor unless the
appropriate courtesy titles are used. Ex parte Hamilton, 156 So. 2d 926 (Ala. 1963), rev'd, 376
U.S. 650 (1964). And it vindicated the right of blacks to be buried in white cemeteries. Terry v.
Elmwood Cemetery, 307 F. Supp. 369, 377 (N.D. Ala. 1969). In the move to appoint black judges
to Alabama's federal bench in 1979-1980, Elaine Jones of the LDF was at the forefront. GRAY,
supra note 2, at 291, 294. Elaine Jones was a supporter of Fred Gray's nomination for U.S. Dis-
trict Judge for the Middle District of Alabama in 1979. Id. at 294.
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